An order for six thousand turkeys is a considerable undertaking, particularly when the merchandise must arrive young, alive, and on a date the buyer can use. In May 1953, Wescott & Winks Hatcheries of Sumner, Iowa, went looking for six thousand Beltsville White poults. At fifty cents apiece, the birds represented a three-thousand-dollar purchase. There was every reason to be particular about delivery. The company did not hatch its own turkeys at the time; it obtained young birds elsewhere and raised them, bringing in successive batches so the operation could manage them.
Leo P. Winks, the hatchery's vice president, sent out cards requesting offers from suppliers around May 20. One recipient was F. M. Stamper Company of Iowa City. Five days later its salesman, Charles Jirsa, telephoned to say the company could take care of the order. The two men were old acquaintances, and the business seemed straightforward enough: six thousand birds, a known price, delivery sought on or about July 17. In the testimony later preserved by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the trouble begins not with an argument over the birds but with a carbon copy.
Jirsa prepared an order form dated May 26 and sent the original to a Missouri hatchery associated with the enterprise. Winks received the carbon. The printed document listed the birds and price, but it also said delivery would be during the week of July 17, while Winks wanted July 17 itself. Anyone unfamiliar with poultry might see a distinction too slight to provoke a dispute. Winks did not. On May 27 he wrote to object to the wording, explaining the exact delivery requirement and asking to hear back if it could not be met. No reply came.
There were other loose ends. The order form called for a fifteen-percent deposit; Wescott & Winks paid none. The salesman had not signed the form. And the operation involved two corporations whose similar names made them look more interchangeable than the law would later allow. Such details can be neglected while a deal seems likely to work. They acquire a different character when no one delivers the goods.
By early June the supplier's hoped-for supply had disappeared. A manager at the Missouri hatchery wrote on June 4 that the necessary Beltsville White eggs could not be obtained. Attempts to find them elsewhere in the country had failed. Wescott & Winks did not learn the bad news in quite the orderly way one might hope: testimony described the buyer hearing from the very egg source on which the salesman had apparently depended. The carefully disputed July date was suddenly beside the point. There would be no poults on July 17, nor during that week, nor under any revised interpretation of the form.
The business did not accept the matter as a simple disappointment. Wescott & Winks brought suit for nine thousand dollars in damages, and the case traveled through the courts until the Iowa Supreme Court issued its decision in October 1957. By then the dispute had lasted more than four years, and the justices were asked to decide whether the seller had been legally bound to supply a flock nobody had managed to secure. The original commercial problem was plain enough. The legal answer depended on documents, signatures, and the distinction between companies with closely connected names.
The court examined the unsigned form, Winks's objection, and a subsequent letter signed by the manager in Missouri. That last document presented a cruel little irony for the buyer: it was signed, but it was a notice that the birds could not be supplied, and the court did not find its author authorized to bind the defendant Iowa corporation. Winks had signed his own letter, but he was the purchaser, not the seller against whom the contract was to be enforced. The law governing sales of goods required a sufficient written memorandum signed by the party to be charged or an authorized agent. The buyer could describe the bargain; it could not produce the requisite signature.
Wescott & Winks argued that the Iowa business and its Missouri parent should be treated as one enterprise. The justices rejected that approach. A parent may own a subsidiary without becoming legally identical to it, and the paperwork could not be rescued by treating every related company representative as an agent of every other company. The judgment for the defendant was affirmed. The court also remarked that the proof of a definite agreement was thin, though it had already resolved the appeal on the writing requirement.
The humor of the affair lies in its utter seriousness. A business expecting six thousand birds had every reason to care about them. The salesman had said he could arrange supply. A hatchery that could not obtain eggs had an unmistakable problem. None of those practical concerns, however, produced the one legally effective piece of paper the buyer needed. The documents eventually outlasted the commercial transaction by decades, preserving in exact detail an order that never reached its destination.
The appellate opinion is full of specifics: Beltsville Whites, fifty cents per bird, a fifteen-percent deposit, the difference between a date and a week, the status of the Missouri corporation, and a series of exhibits numbered by lawyers. Of the six thousand poults themselves, there is nothing to show. The last word belonged to the paperwork.